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In this note we prove the existence of minmax points for strategic form games where the
sets of strategies are topological spaces and the payoff functions satisfy conditions weaker
than continuity. The employed tools are the class of transfer weakly upper continuous
functions and the class of weakly lower pseudocontinuous functions. An example shows
that our result is of minimal character.
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1. Introduction and preliminaries
A signiﬁcant topic in the theory of strategic form games is that of repeated games: a repeated game consists in a strategic
form game played several times, even inﬁnite. In such a case, players could reach an outcome better than that obtained if
the game is played only once. In fact, observing the auctions played at time t , the players have information in order to
choose, again in a non-cooperative setting, auctions at the time t + 1 which lead to a better outcome: for instance, suppose
that a game is played inﬁnite times and there exists a strategy proﬁle x more proﬁtable than the Nash equilibrium which
comes from the one shot game; moreover, assume that, if a player i deviates from x at the time t , the opponents can play
in a way such that i gets the worst at any following time. Now, in view of the punishment from the opponents, player i
is not willing to deviate from x. Hence, the existence of a punishment is crucial to force players to not deviate: we refer
to [5] and references therein for a detailed exposition. The punishment for a player i is deﬁned – see [5] – as a strategy
proﬁle of the opponents which realizes the minimum among the best outcomes that i can obtain. This idea is captured by
the deﬁnition of minmax points.
Formally, let G = (X1, . . . , Xn,u1, . . . ,un) be an n-player strategic form game, where, for any player i, Xi is the (non-
empty) set of its strategies and ui is the real-valued payoff function deﬁned on the set of strategy proﬁles X = ∏nj=1 X j .
We denote a strategy proﬁle x also by (xi, x−i), where xi ∈ Xi and x−i ∈ X−i =∏ j =i X j . Assume that any player wishes to
maximize his payoff. A strategy proﬁle xi is said to be a minmax point for player i if the following holds:
min
x−i∈X−i
max
xi∈Xi
ui(xi, x−i) = ui
(
xii, x
i
−i
)= max
xi∈Xi
ui
(
xi, x
i
−i
)
(1)
while νi = ui(xii, xi−i) is said to be minmax value. Moreover, we say that G has minmax points if there exist minmax points
for any player; in such a case, the vector ν = (ν1, . . . , νn) is said to be minmax value of G .
The minmax value satisﬁes also the following property (see [5]): no equilibrium of the repeated game can give to player i
a payoff less than his minmax value, which implies that deviation from an equilibrium path can be punished with the minmax
value. Moreover, the minmax value plays a central role in the Folk Theorem: see [4,5].
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the payoffs are non-necessarily continuous functions (we call this kind of games discontinuous), for which minmax points
exist, following the wide investigation on discontinuous strategic form games: among the others, let us cite the seminal
paper [3] and [9,8,10,11,7,13].
In the setting of games with continuous payoff functions, an existence result for minmax points has been given in [1].1
In order to provide suﬃcient conditions which guarantee the existence of minmax points for discontinuous strategic
form games, let us recall some classes of discontinuous real-valued functions: a function f : X →R is said to be
– transfer weakly upper continuous if f (x) < f (x′) implies that there exists a neighborhood N of x and x′′ such that f (z)
f (x′′) for all z ∈ N;
– weakly lower pseudocontinuous if f (x′) < f (x) implies f (x′) lim infz→x f (z).2
In a similar way, one can deﬁne transfer weakly lower continuous and weakly upper pseudocontinuous functions. The class of
transfer weakly continuous functions has been introduced in [14] in order to give a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the existence of maximum and minimum points on compact topological space. The class of weakly pseudocontinuous
function has been introduced ﬁrst in [6] in order to give suﬃcient conditions for the existence of solutions to minsup and
maxsup problems in a sequential setting. Then, the topological version recalled above has been introduced in [12], where
convergence properties of sequence of transfer weakly continuous functions and of sequence of weakly pseudocontinuous
functions have been investigated.
2. Existence of minmax points
Now, we obtain the existence of minmax points in strategic games where the payoffs are less than continuous. The
crucial tool is the following result:
Lemma 1. Let A1 and A2 be compact topological spaces and let f be a weakly lower pseudocontinuous function on A1 × A2 such that,
for any a2 ∈ A2 , f (·,a2) is transfer weakly upper continuous on A1 . Then, there exist a∗1 ∈ A1 and a∗2 ∈ A2 such that:
min
a2∈A2
max
a1∈A1
f (a1,a2) = f
(
a∗1,a∗2
)= max
a1∈A1
f
(
a1,a
∗
2
)
.
Proof. First, we consider the function φ deﬁned over A2 by φ(a2) = maxa1∈A1 f (a1,a2) – since f (·,a2) is transfer weakly
upper continuous for any a2 and A1 is compact, the function φ is well deﬁned: see [14, Theorem 1] – and we prove that
φ is weakly lower pseudocontinuous. Let φ(a′2) < φ(a2). So, for a suitable a1 ∈ A1, one has f (a′1,a′2) < f (a1,a2) for each
a′1 ∈ A1 and, the function f being weakly lower pseudocontinuous at (a1,a2),
f
(
a′1,a′2
)
 lim inf
z1→a1
z2→a2
f (z1, z2) lim inf
z2→a2
φ(z2)
for each a′1 ∈ A1, which implies φ(a′2) lim infz2→a2 φ(z2). Hence, the function φ is weakly lower pseudocontinuous at a2.
Now, since any weakly lower pseudocontinuous function is also transfer weakly lower continuous, in light of [14, The-
orem 1], there exists at least an a∗2 ∈ A2 such that φ(a∗2) φ(a2) for any a2 ∈ A2. Moreover, there exists a∗1 ∈ A1 such that
f (a∗1,a∗2) = φ(a∗2), and the proof is concluded. 
We note that the assumption of weak lower pseudocontinuity on f (·, ·) cannot be relaxed by using the transfer weak
lower continuity. In fact, consider the function f deﬁned on [0,1] × [0,1] as below (see [6, Example 3.2]):
f (a1,a2) =
{− 12 (a1 + a2) if (a1,a2) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1[,
a1 − a2 if (a1,a2) ∈ [0,1] × {1}.
The function f is transfer weakly lower continuous on [0,1] × [0,1] and f (·,a2) is transfer weakly upper continuous on
[0,1] for any a2 ∈ [0,1], but φ does not have minimum points over [0,1].
Finally, minmax points exist for a class of discontinuous games:
Theorem 1. Let G = (X1, . . . , Xn,u1, . . . ,un) be a strategic form game such that, for any player i, Xi is compact, ui is weakly lower
pseudocontinuous on X and ui(·, x−i) is transfer weakly upper continuous on Xi for any x−i ∈ X−i . Then, the game has minmax points.
1 [1, Theorem 2.5], where a class of discontinuous functions has been considered, is not correct.
2 We recall that lim infz→x f (z) = supN∈N (x) infz∈N f (z), where N (x) is the set of neighborhood of x.
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by f (a1,a2) = ui(xi, x−i). 
Let us note that games with payoff functions which satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1 arise, for example, when the
players choose according to weakly continuous binary relations: see [2] for the deﬁnition and the motivations; in fact the
utility functions of such binary relations are weakly pseudocontinuous. Besides, in the following example we have a game
which satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 1.
Example 1. Let G = (X1, X2,u1,u2) where X1 = [0,1], X2 = [0,2], u2 is continuous and u1 is deﬁned as below:
u1(x1, x2) =
{
1− x2 if x2 ∈ [0,1[,
0 if x2 ∈ [1,2]
if x1 ∈ [0,1[
and
u1(x1, x2) =
{
1− x2 if x2 ∈ [0,1],
−1 if x2 ∈ ]1,2]
if x1 = 1.
In this game, player 1 can be of two types and he can choose which type he wants to belong. Even if the payoffs of
both types are very simple, the function u1 is not continuous but weakly lower pseudocontinuous and u1(·, x2) is transfer
weakly upper continuous for any x2.
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